Daily Auction: Difference between revisions
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Auction resets every day at 16:00 UTC. | Auction resets every day at 16:00 UTC. | ||
There are | There are 4 groups of auctions: one group uses [[Credits]] for bidding, while the other three groups each accept different [[Holo-Tags]] as bidding currency. | ||
Auction items may include, any virtual items, | Auction items may include, any virtual items, [[Virtual Resources]] or even NFTs | ||
<h2>Auction Rules</h2> | <h2>Auction Rules</h2> | ||
Vickrey auction is also known as Second-price sealed-bid auction. None of the bidders know what the other is offering. The bidder with the highest price wins, but only pays the value of the next highest bid. The most important feature of these auctions is that each bidder's winning strategy is to bid according to their true valuation of the item; this auction mechanism is thus incentive-compatible. It is also a Pareto efficient allocation mechanism. | Vickrey auction is also known as Second-price sealed-bid auction. None of the bidders know what the other is offering. The bidder with the highest price wins, but only pays the value of the next highest bid. The most important feature of these auctions is that each bidder's winning strategy is to bid according to their true valuation of the item; this auction mechanism is thus incentive-compatible. It is also a Pareto efficient allocation mechanism. | ||
Revision as of 03:18, 23 June 2024
Auction resets every day at 16:00 UTC.
There are 4 groups of auctions: one group uses Credits for bidding, while the other three groups each accept different Holo-Tags as bidding currency.
Auction items may include, any virtual items, Virtual Resources or even NFTs
Auction Rules
Vickrey auction is also known as Second-price sealed-bid auction. None of the bidders know what the other is offering. The bidder with the highest price wins, but only pays the value of the next highest bid. The most important feature of these auctions is that each bidder's winning strategy is to bid according to their true valuation of the item; this auction mechanism is thus incentive-compatible. It is also a Pareto efficient allocation mechanism.