Daily Auction: Difference between revisions
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Auction items may include, any virtual items, [[Virtual Resources]] or even NFTs | Auction items may include, any virtual items, [[Virtual Resources]] or even NFTs | ||
The auction results are shown in [[Statistics]]. | |||
<h2>Auction Rules</h2> | <h2>Auction Rules</h2> | ||
Vickrey auction is also known as Second-price sealed-bid auction. None of the bidders know what the other is offering. The bidder with the highest price wins, but only pays the value of the next highest bid. The most important feature of these auctions is that each bidder's winning strategy is to bid according to their true valuation of the item; this auction mechanism is thus incentive-compatible. It is also a Pareto efficient allocation mechanism. | Vickrey auction is also known as Second-price sealed-bid auction. None of the bidders know what the other is offering. The bidder with the highest price wins, but only pays the value of the next highest bid. The most important feature of these auctions is that each bidder's winning strategy is to bid according to their true valuation of the item; this auction mechanism is thus incentive-compatible. It is also a Pareto efficient allocation mechanism. | ||
Revision as of 05:52, 23 June 2024
Auction resets every day at 16:00 UTC.
There are 4 groups of auctions: one group uses Credits for bidding, while the other three groups each accept different Holo-Tags as bidding currency.
Auction items may include, any virtual items, Virtual Resources or even NFTs
The auction results are shown in Statistics.
Auction Rules
Vickrey auction is also known as Second-price sealed-bid auction. None of the bidders know what the other is offering. The bidder with the highest price wins, but only pays the value of the next highest bid. The most important feature of these auctions is that each bidder's winning strategy is to bid according to their true valuation of the item; this auction mechanism is thus incentive-compatible. It is also a Pareto efficient allocation mechanism.